Irony is the form of paradox.
Paradox is what is good
and great at the same time.
— Friedrich Schlegel
The other, namely, that It is not,
and that something must needs not be,
that, I tell thee, is a wholly
For you cannot know what is not –
that is impossible –
nor utter it …
Derrida introduces the motif ‘différance’, of the purposive misspelling of the word difference, for purposes of ‘strategy’. The playfulness associated with its usage is meant to be disruptive, subversive and adventurous (note Beaufret’s third question to Heidegger in the Letter on Humanism, regarding turning philosophy itself into an adventuress). Différance, according to Derrida, is neither a concept nor a word, but a motif which intimates a play that, he claims, is prior to Being, and the ontological difference between beings and Being. This motif that is neither a word nor a concept is instead a trace of that which does not itself have being, or presence. Derrida informs us moreover that he intends the essay with its nameless name to proceed through the intensification of the play of the sign which, with regard to our customary expectations, is a misspelling – or perhaps a child’s game of no immediately useful significance.
An initial indication that such a misspelling does not concern itself merely with the games of a charlatan is that the difference between the two versions of the word, and that the difference itself can only be verified by the text (through our noting an ‘e’ or and ‘a’). Writing becomes the topical space for the verification of meaning. Nevertheless, the example of differenace serves to disclose the instability of reference, even in the written word, in light of the intensification of the play of the alleged error which incites myriad readings, diverse conflicting meanings – or, in still other words, of the polysemy of a text conceived as participating in the negotiation between any restricted and general economy (Cf. the distinction between the ‘restricted’ and the ‘general’ economy’ in Bataille’s Accursed Share, Volume 1). IN such a situation of uncertainty, of ambiguity, there erupts a proliferation of meanings for even a single sign. In this way, even as writing becomes the ground of meaning vis-a-vis the phonetic, vocal aspects of language, it itself is still an abyss, abgrund, in which certified meanings are ceaselessly disrupted and transformed.
As the difference in the sign is only detectable in a purely graphic manner, Derrida will suggest that the ‘a’ and ‘différance’ exist as traces of something that never existed, of the play of difference prior to Being or beings. This method of play is exhibited when he associates, in a seemingly random manner, the shape of the capital A with a pyramid, calling this a tomb, and then inexplicitly suggests that this tomb intimates the economy of death that hides in silence, in secret, without presence, before Being and beings – he alludes that this economy of death, this tomb of the ‘a’ in différance, intimates the death of the tyrant – of the absolutisation of meaning, of one privileged, proper meaning – of the capital letter.
Not yet sufficiently under his spell, we immediately understand that this is not all merely random, but that the play has a purpose, and one that requires that there is introduced a differing sense of the field upon which we will play. It may be helpful to think of Derrida, in this instance, of setting forth a language game in the manner of Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. From this perspective, Derrida is laying out a sense of his basic agenda through the cultivation of an ensemble of motifs, metaphors and tactical analyses so as to illuminate a thought which he wishes to convey to the reader. At the same time, with the subversion of the authorial presence that is undertaken with this essay, his very attempt to communicate to the reader will necessarily be subverted also, and he intimates this possibility when he intimates that the motif of différance itself will have to be erased.
In a provisional way, Derrida compares the polysemy intimated by the motif of différance to a sheaf, a bundle of things of a similar length, such as a sheath of papers. Moreover, the metaphor of a sheath of papers is further described as having the ‘complex structure of weaving’ (p. 3) of differing meanings, of differing forces, similar in many ways to Nietzsche’s genealogical tracing of the myriad eruptions of will-to-power. Both of these metaphors are relevant in that each intimates the practise of writing, as with, on the one hand, a sheath of papers exhibiting vast matrices of words, and on the other, a weaving as in textiles, another metaphor for the strands of sentences and internal relationships within a text and between texts. In this way, Derrida intimates that meaning resides in the interrelation of the signs which are operative within the general economy of the text, of the place of polysemy beyond the restricted economy of a privileged language game that stands over all as the proper meaning.
The motif of différance underlines, as we have intimated, the difference between spoken and written language, a discussion that will become important in dealing with the alleged immediacy of the spoken word in Saussure, and the intimacy of speech with Being in Heidegger. This issue will disclose itself, for Derrida, as concerning a metaphysics of presence in which the subject is alleged to have an intimate relation to a presence that can be spoken in words – and is thus the event that becomes to designate the proper. As he has made clear, we can only detect the difference between the motif and the usual spelling by graphic means. In this context, the written text will serve as the rule by which the poken discourse is surveilled in terms of its usage. At the same time, however, Derrida questions the purity of spoken language in terms of the embeddedness of the latter in a historical culture of phonetic writing, which is enacted within the hegemonic theoretical framework in which spoken discourse is recorded in written language. For Derrida, our spoken language is already always intermeshed within the texture and sheaf of the general economy of différance.
Moreover, as the distinction has itself broken down between writing and speech, Derrida suggests that the place of différance lies in-between ‘beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other, occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are two.’ (p. 5) This disruption of our usual distinction between speech and writing and the priority we give to the former (in the restricted economy of the metaphysics of subjectivity) is the first subversive fruit of différance. But, as we are to experience, as readers, the intensification of the play of this motif, we will begin to fathom that many distinctions, opposites, such as that between the sensible and the intelligible, will begin to be disrupted, put out of play, destructured and re-situated within the field of the general economy.
In this light, différance, at first a seemingly playful game, becomes a haunting threat to our familiar designations of meaning, of the hierarchies between our universals and particulars. It is not enough to merely reject hierarchy – all one would need to do is to point to hierarchy to refute such a rejection – or to suppress the one who would unseat a tyrant. Derrida’s strategy is different – he subverts hierarchy by exposing its weakest link, by wilfully intimating the exception, of the originary no-thing, the motif that will not reassure us in our illusions, but will, on the contrary, remind us that all of our notions of certainty, meaning, hierarchy – of what is right and proper – that all of our tranquility is based tenuously upon a tapestry of illusions, enacted and maintained through violence and self-deception.
At the same time, however, Derrida is not merely deploying différance as would a soldier a strategy in battle, at least one with a definite and final goal. As I have already indicted, not only is Derrida’s motif of différance strategic, it is also, in a provocation of Heidegger, who seeks an impossible nearness to Being, adventurous, reck-less (Cf. ‘Anaximander Fragment’). Indeed, Derrida, in terms of his metaphor of play and playfulness, is unleashing a strategy without finality, of ‘blind tactics’, ‘wandering’ – all motifs that point to Nietzsche’s intimation of an innocence of becoming. After the overthrow of the tyrant, there will be not be a new king, no new arche – it will be an-arche, without a ruling principle of authority, of the proper, or, of the absolutism of the metaphysical subject with its self-consciousness. As another link with Nietzsche, Derrida is inciting the emergence of the multiplicity of the self, and of the complexity of the finite self with respect to its embeddedness within the historical, cultural, psychological and somatic matrices of existence.
Différance – Semantic Analysis
Derrida undertakes an analysis of the approximate sense, or meaning, of différance through a consideration of the semantic roots for the word difference. On the one hand there is diapherein, which is Greek for a distinction, distance or polemos between differing things, which Derrida interprets with a predominantly spatial meaning. On the other hand, there is the Latin différer, which, in addition to the spatial meaning of diapherein, has an additional temporal sense of delay, detour, including the sense of temporal delay in the word re-presentation, for instance. Derrida prefers this Latin sense as it incorporates the spatial and temporal sense of différer, and in a way that would allow, with différance, a subversion and displacement of the traditional distinction between time and space with the alternatives of temporalisation and spacing.
Différance, in this way, not limited to the historical rules of usage, is ‘irreducibly polysemic.’ In this polysemia, différance seems to act in such a way as to subvert the familiar and tranquil illusion that we have cultivated for ourselves. At the same time, Derrida means to make clear that différance, although seeming to be the productive source of difference, of all things (as with Empedoclean strife), is, in light of the ‘a’ of polysemia, neither active, nor passive, but recalls a ‘middle voice’, a non-transitivity, prior to the repressive enactment of the hierarchy of the active and the passive (upon which, Derrida muses, philosophy as metaphysics established itself).
Detour of the Sign – Saussure
In terms of classical semiology (science of the sign), the sign is characterised as a substitute which takes place of the thing that is signified. Derrida writes, ‘We take or give signs. We signal. The sign, in this sense, deferred presence…’ – or, ‘…signification as the différance of temporization.’ For Saussure, the character of the sign is twofold: 1) the sign is differential as it acquires its meaning from the system of differential signs in any language or system of thought; 2) a sign is arbitrary, since it arises from difference and has no positive reference to a thing outside of the system of signs. The sign itself is divided, furthermore, into the signifier and the signified. The latter is the concept or the meaning of the sign; the signifier is an ‘image’ or ‘psychical imprint’ or, the ‘acoustic phenomenon’ of a spoken word. As Saussure contends, ‘Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms.’ In other words, the signifier and the signified arise from within the system of language itself. In this way, meaning arises due to a systematic play of differences, and we can readily see Derrida’s interest in Saussure in light of his own motif of différance. Moreover, in light of Saussure, we can understand how Derrida could regard différance as an originary play of difference which itself gives rise to conceptuality (similar to the transcendental imagination in the schematism of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason), without itself being either active or passive, present or absent in terms of the metaphysics of subjectivity.
Derrida writes, ‘Différance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name “origin” no longer suits it.’ In this way, we are enclosed, to return to a previous metaphor, within a circular texture of a weave of differences, not fully unlike Heidegger’s indication of language as the ‘house of Being’. We will return to Heidegger below; however, Derrida is insistent that there is no presence outside of the system of difference, to which any sign refers in the manner of the classical theory of correspondence. Meaning is generated from within the matrix of signification, and thus, for Derrida, there is no exit from the system of differences as there is no outside. There is only the play of différance which makes possible the deferring (temporalisation) and differing (spacing) nexus of relation between what we illusorily regard as separate present moments. But, as we will see, différance, for Derrida, is not Being, but is the economy of death prior to Being and its difference with beings.
What is différance?
Derrida may be regarded as unnecessarily slippery and perhaps absurd in his seeming unwillingness to play the traditional game of meaning – or, as Nietzsche writes in ‘On Truth and Lying in the Extra-Moral Sense’, of lying according to the established convention. However, he asks us to look at the very form of the question that is being asked of him. What is …? The form of such a question, as Heidegger and Wittgenstein also repeatedly point out, desires the answer of an unambiguous, simple and full definition, based, Derrida contends, upon some present being. In other words, the ‘substantive’ about which we ask, such as horse, is immediately linked to a ‘substance’ in terms of the metaphysics of subjectivity and presence. Such a desire for a single, authoritative account necessitates a repression of the polysemic play of difference, and indeed, a falsification of the generative topos of meaning in the context – either a ‘system’ or ‘makeshift’ – of differences.
That which is behind such an insistence on the part of Derrida, and which is linked to the notion of a ‘metaphysics of subjectivity’ which has been mentioned several times, is a rejection of the existence of a ‘subject’ (and a notion of a ‘subject’ is always metaphysical and operates according to a specific grammar) that is somehow outside of the play of differences. In other words, language is not a ‘function of the speaking subject’. Derrida continues, in a manner that will be relevant to talk of ‘Being’:
This implies that the subject (in its identity with itself, of, eventually in its consciousness of its identity with itself, its self-consciousness) is inscribed in language, is a “function” of language, comes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform – even in so-called “creation,” or in so-called “transgression” – to the system of rules of language as a system of differences, or at very least by conforming to the general law of différance, or by adhering to the principle of language which Saussure says is “spoke language minus speech.
Derrida entertains the possible objection that there can be a self-presence of the self prior to speech and language, suggesting that such a possibility would be to hold that ‘something like consciousness is possible.’ But, he asks, “What is consciousness?” He contends that it has always referred to self-presence, and thus to a privileged present moment, one whose privilege is the ‘ether of metaphysics’, of the notion of a substance that represses or abjects (Kristeva) from its own meaning, traces of the past or futurity and the otherness of that which is ‘distant’ – or in other words, of différance in the sense of temporalisation and spatialisation of the muliplicitous finite self which abides amid the ‘system of differences’, of language as its dwelling.
There are important implications which arise amidst this tracing of the ‘subject’ back into its own context of emergence – as the subject is just another name that has arbitrarily arisen from the play of différance, from the system of difference. That it could become a subject as that which stands under (hypokeimenon) or outside the play of différance is the ‘result’ – for Derrida – of a repression of the multiplicity of the self and its emergence from the general economy of polysemous difference. Derrida points out that, in the historicity of thought, he has precedents in the priority of the ‘unconscious’ in Nietzsche (he may have wished also to mention Schelling), in the ‘repressive hypothesis’ of Freud, in the ‘Expenditure’ of Bataille, in the Aufhebung of Hegel and in the ‘Other’ of Levinas. Each of these thinkers subvert and displace the notion of a self-present subject or consciousness that transcends the context of receptivity, alterity, otherness – or, in other words, that obviates the system of difference which is language in its differing and deferring flux of différance.
For Nietzsche, that which we regard as the self is an irreducible multiplicity which arises from the terrain of the will to power, of the genealogy of agonistic forces. For Freud, that which is considered to be the self is a product of a conflict between differing forces of the personality, the id and the superego – which results in the tenuous ‘stability’ of the ego, or the self which survives due to its postponement of its radical drive for pleasure and expenditure (death) – or of its keeping something of itself in reserve in the wake of its adoption of the reality principle. For Bataille, as mentioned, there are the notions of a ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ economies in which the former attempts to preserve itself from the polysemous expenditure of the latter. For Hegel, any positing of identity immediately provokes the contrary of difference, of contradiction and the Aufhebung of the former into the latter in a continuous dialectical movement of temporalisation – recall Hegel’s demand that we ‘Think Contradiction’ in his Science of Logic. And, finally, for Levinas, it is the ‘Other’ and our inescapable ethical obligation to the Other, prior to any ‘ontology’ of the subject which asserts the necessity that ethics be regarded as ‘first philosophy’. I am not making the suggestion, nor is Derrida, that all of these examples of post-structuralist deconstructions of the notion of the ‘subject’ are the same, but instead, that each of these relies upon the tracing of the emergence of the ‘subject’ from the play of difference. That which is occurring with respect to the ‘subject’ is not, in this way, a ‘decentring’ of THE SUBJECT, as that would be to assume the prior (metaphysical) existence of that which is only generated from the repression of the general economy into a restricted economy.
Derrida and Heidegger
Derrida begins the final movement of his essay with a turn to Heidegger and a meditation on the ‘relation’ of différance to the ontological difference in Heidegger’s philosophy. From his references to Heidegger, it is clear that Derrida is not merely referring to the account of the ontological difference in Being and Time, but has also taken into account the epochal thinking of Being that had arisen with the turn (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought. Derrida’s basic question seems to be – in light of his deconstruction of subjectivity and the metaphysics of presence – whether différance is merely another name for the ontological difference, or instead, if the ontological difference and the question of Being are merely ‘intrametaphysical effects’ of différance. In other words, is différance the general economy from which Being itself and the difference between Being and being is originally generated – just as we detected in the case of subjectivity and presence? Or, in still another way, is Being (especially as the main actor in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism) the product of a repression of the polysemic and open-ended play of différance? Derrida gives a rather tentative beginning of an answer:
The unfolding of différance is perhaps not solely the truth of Being, or of the epochality of Being. Perhaps we must attempt to think this unheard-of-thought, this silent tracing: the history of Being, whose thought engages the Greco-Western logos such as it is produced via the ontological difference, is but an epoch of the diapherein (see above as the difference between things). Henceforth one could no longer even call this an “epoch,” the concept of epochality belonging to what is within history as the history of Being. Since Being has never had a “meaning,” has never been thought or said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then différance, in a certain and very strange way, (is) “older” than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this ago it can be called the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, of the différance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no maintaining and no depth to, to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play.
The main points of Derrida’s contention here is that 1) Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference is the same as the Greek diapherein, conceived as the difference of beings or things: such an ontological difference would be that between beings and the being of beings (though not yet of Being as Being); 2) that the epochality of Being, the truth of Being and the history of Being are the same – and that différance exceeds not only the ontological difference between being and beings, but also, as the trace of the play of difference, it also exceeds the epochality of Being, etc. Derrida writes:
As rigorously as possible we must permit to appear/disappear the trace of what exceeds the truth of Being. The trace (of that) which can never be presented, the trace which itself can never be presented: that is, appear and manifest itself, as such, in its phenomenon. The trace beyond that which profoundly links fundamental ontology and phenomenology. Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the a writing itself, inscribing its pyramid in différance.
I would like to suggest the possibility that Derrida has given a faulty interpretation of Heidegger in the previous quotations – though to discern the fault would require a very detailed reading, and thus, it is a fault that would be rarely detected, perhaps even by Derrida himself. That which is missing in his account thus far is Being as Being, which, as we can read from the ‘Letter on Humanism’, is not the Being of beings (the presencing or the horizon of the presencing of beings), but Being itself in its radical non-presence, prior and beyond its throw or destining of its truth, as the truth or self-showing, unconcealing of Being (Seyn).
In this context, Heidegger refers to Being as Being as ‘It’ as in the es gibt, it gives, as the gift. However, the ontological difference, which arises from the gift is forgotten in that as it gives its truth, Being withdraws with the entry of beings, and thus, its articulation as Being is, as with différance, merely a trace of that which is not. I contend that the problem with Derrida’s reading is his reliance upon a faulty reading by Levinas in Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, which has conflated the differing senses of Sein as the being of beings and Being as Being. The latter, after Heidegger’s turn (Kehre) and his jettisoning of the last remnants of the ‘metaphysics of subjectivity’ is no longer associated with presence, nor is it an absence – instead ‘It’ is ‘Nothing’ – aletheia – that gives, that destines its truth. It is through the withdrawal that we forget Being and thus inaugurate the history of Being as metaphysics.
My critical reading of Derrida is underscored by 1) his anachronistic reference to fundamental ontology which is only operative in Being and Time, and is abandoned as a phrase after the turn to metontology (Krell). Nevertheless, a fundamental ontology in Being and Time is still merely concerned with the being of beings; 2) that the ontological difference is not merely that of diapherein as Heidegger explicitly indicates temporality as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, which would include the reference to deferral or temporalisation; 3) that there is a more complex notion of the ontological difference operative in the later Heidegger as not only that between the being of beings and beings, but also the difference between both of these and Being itself, the undisclosed or the earth (Cf. Julian Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, p. 10). This is also underscored when Derrida explicitly writes that the ontological difference between Being and beings is the ‘difference between presence and the present’. It seems that the confusion arises from Heidegger’s usage of the word Being (even Seyn or Being), which for Derrida, seems to entail that Heidegger remains trapped in the ‘metaphysics of presence’, and perhaps, even of subjectivity as the subjectivity of Being).
The difficulty with attempting to criticise Derrida in this context is his insistence on re-inscribing his seeming faulty interpretation of Heidegger into the lexicon of his own motif of différance and the trace. Derrida quotes Heidegger to the effect that the forgetting of Being leaves not a trace of the difference between Being and beings. Moreover, with Derrida’s suggestion that différance exceeds the ontological difference (it is its own trace in that différance traces the difference) and of the difference between presence and absence, he writes that to forget the difference between Being and beings would be the disappearance of the trace of the trace. It is not clear if this act of re-inscription into another lexicon is helpful in understanding Heidegger (if there still is a ‘Heidegger’), or, in fact, the more important question of whether or not Derrida is accurate in his interpretation of Heidegger. Again, we begin to sense the disruptive and subversive implications of his motif, even amid the basic attempt to set forth an assessment of his reading.
For, immediately, he sets out a quotation from Heidegger which, Derrida writes, ‘seems to imply’ his re-inscription. The quotation refers to the oblivion of Being and how Being withdraws immediately with the destining of Being. This would be to refer to Being as Being and not to the being of beings or to the difference of the latter from beings. In other words, Being as Being withdraws and never comes to presence or its manifest as a thing that is present. Indeed, Being as Being is Nothing (das Nichts) and itself exceeds the metaphysics of subjectivity and presence. However, not sooner than Derrida gives us this quotation, he immediately returns to his project of re-inscription into the lexicon of différance, trace, simulacrum and erasure. It is in this way that a clear grasp of his criticism of Heidegger is obscured by his own attempt to set forth a motif that is ‘older’ than Being. Derrida writes:
“Older” than Being itself, such a différance has no name in our language. But, we “already know” that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of “différance,” which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions.
While it is arguable that Derrida has not given us a strictly accurate reading of Heidegger, and also that his own project of re-inscription was more of a hindrance than an aid in an interpretation of Heidegger, there still remains the central question of Derrida’s polemic: is the use of the word ‘Being’ by Heidegger the attempt to set forth a ‘master-name’ that eludes the system of difference that has been set forth by Derrida? Moreover, is his conception of Being, as it seems to rely on a faulty interpretation, adequate to his own attempt to criticise Heidegger (especially in light of our linkage of Being as Being with Empedocles notion of the play between strife and love in the ‘Letter on Humanism’)? Finally, is Being a name, or instead, is it a recollection from our own historicity of the gift? Derrida writes:
There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this without nostalgia, that is, outside the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost native country of thought. On the contrary, we must affirm this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance.
The question in other words is this – is Heidegger, in light of that which we have heard in the ‘Letter on Humanism’, especially with regard to the discussion of homelessness and the poetry of Holderlin as that which articulates language as the house of Being, seeking to discover ‘… the proper word and the unique name’? Derrida gives a quotation from Heidegger in which he writes, ‘… in order to name the essential nature of Being, language would have to find a single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring every thoughtful word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since Being speaks always and everywhere through language.’ The question is whether such a unique word, though not impossible, is ever to be a ‘primordial’, ‘essential’ Word – or, whether, in light of Derrida’s motif of différance, it is merely the another instance of a repetitive repression of the play of difference, and of the possibility that far from hoping to find the unique word in one language (such as the German of Holderlin), we can express many words, as being is said in many ways.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 7.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 8.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P. 9.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 10.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 10-11.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 11.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 15.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 16.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 22.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 23.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 23.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 26.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 27.
 Derrida, J. (1968) ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 27.